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After eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange: The Changing
Landscape for Patent Remedies
Bernard H. Chao*
INTRODUCTION
On May 15, 2006, the United States Supreme Court
decided eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., and overruled
years of Federal Circuit precedent governing the issuance
of permanent injunctions.1 Under existing Federal Circuit
law, once a defendant has been determined to infringe a
valid patent, there was a “general rule that courts will
issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement
absent exceptional circumstances.”2 The only recognized
exception to this rule was a narrow “public interest”
exception,3 in which “a court may decline to enter an
injunction when ‘a patentee's failure to practice the
patented invention frustrates an important public need for
the invention,’” such as the need to use an invention to
protect public health.4 This narrow exception was rarely
used.5
*

* Bernard Chao is a partner with the law firm of Chao Hadidi Stark
& Barker LLP in Silicon Valley. Mr. Chao specializes in providing patent
advice to high technology companies. He is also currently serving as a
Special Master for the United States District Court for the Central
District of California in a multidistrict litigation involving approximately
fifty different lawsuits and thirty patents. Mr. Chao has a B.S. in
Electrical Engineering from Purdue University and J.D. from Duke
University School of Law. The views expressed in this article are solely
Mr. Chao’s and should not be attributed to his law firm or its clients.
1
. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C. (eBay III), 547 U.S. 388
(2006).
2
. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (eBay II), 401 F.3d 1323,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d
1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
3
. Id. (quoting Rite-Hite Corp. v. Kelley Co., Inc., 56 F.3d 1538,
1547–48 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 867 (1995)).
4
. Id.
5
. See, Hybritech, Inc. v. Abbott Lab., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d 1001 (C.D. Cal.
1987) (public interest in the availability of medical test kits justified a
denial of a preliminary injunction), aff’d, 849 F.2d 1446, 1458 (Fed. Cir.
1988); Vitamin Technologists, Inc. v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 64
U.S.P.Q. 285 (9th Cir. 1945) (public interest warranted refusal of
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In eBay, the Supreme Court held that permanent
injunctions in patent cases should be determined using the
same four factor test that courts have historically used in
other contexts when deciding whether to issue an
injunction.6 That test requires courts to analyze: (1) whether
the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without the
injunction; (2) whether there is an adequate remedy at law;
(3) the balance of hardships on the respective parties; and
(4) whether granting an injunction would disservice the
public interest.
In view of this new standard, many
successful patent plaintiffs will no longer be granted a
permanent injunction. This has led courts to face two sets of
new issues: (1) identifying what facts are important in
determining whether to issue a permanent injunction in a
patent case, and (2) determining how to handle future
infringement after a permanent injunction is denied.
The lower courts have now had almost two years to
interpret eBay and identify what facts are important in
determining when permanent injunctions will be issued. This
Article provides a critical analysis of these cases7, and
discusses fact patterns that should be considered when
deciding whether to issue a permanent injunction.
Specifically, this critique utilizing the recent lower court
decisions assesses how reliance on specific fact patterns
balances (or, perhaps, undermines) the goals of the patent
system—promoting innova-tion without stifling competition.8
A permanent injunction has the effect of both denying the
public at least some benefit from the patented invention and
bestowing an economic reward for developing patented
technology to the patent holder. By using economic analysis
to characterize the issues, courts should be able to
consistently apply the eBay factors to grant or deny
injunctions in a manner that furthers the goals of the patent
injunction on irradiation of oleomargarine).
6
. eBay III, 547 U.S. at 394.
7
. The review attempted to encompass all Federal Circuit cases
through February 2008. However, the author did not review all district
court decisions. Instead, cases from the most common patent forums,
most notably the Eastern District of Texas, and specific high profile cases
were reviewed.
8
. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1–14 (2003) (discussing goals of patent
policy), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/ innovationrpt.pdf
[hereinafter INNOVATION].
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system.
After eBay, successful patents plaintiffs cannot obtain
permanent injunctions as a matter of course. Instead, these
plaintiffs will have to satisfy the four factor test. Thus, for
the first time, courts confront issues of remedies for future
infringement where the accused infringer continues to
violate the terms of the patent. Without a clear statutory
basis for doing so, some courts have granted plaintiffs an
ongoing royalty (a compulsory license that is only available
to the losing defendant).
This Article suggests that the
courts do not have the authority to grant ongoing royalties.
However, that is not as problematic as it might appear. Due
to the availability of other remedies, courts can “do
nothing.” Even if a court were to refuse to impose an
ongoing royalty, defendants still must choose between: (1)
avoiding future infringement, (2) negotiating a license, or (3)
risking a second lawsuit that should result in a finding of
willful infringement and enhanced damages. This solution
should adequately guard a patent holder’s rights within the
current statutory framework.
This Article is structured so that Part I describes the facts
and holding of the eBay decision. Part II analyzes decisions
applying eBay’s four factor test and identifies three
categories of fact patterns that have played a prominent role
in determining whether or not to grant a permanent
injunction. These categories are: (1) the existence or lack of
direct competition, (2) the institutional status of the plaintiff
(e.g. research institution or troll), and (3) the relative
contribution the patented invention has to the infringing
device. This Article discusses how courts have applied the
four factor test to cases that possess these fact patterns and
how the application does or does not meet the goals of the
patent system.
Part III goes on to discuss what happens when a
permanent injunction is not issued. Part III A describes one
approach that the Federal Circuit has approved, granting a
compulsory license to the losing defendant which the courts
now call an “ongoing royalty.” This Article explores the
purported basis for this remedy and argues that it is not
reasoned. Part III B suggests that courts should not award
an ongoing royalty in place of a permanent injunction. The
doctrine of willful infringement allows a prevailing plaintiff to
continue to enforce its patent in the absence of both a
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THE FACTS OF eBAY

In eBay, the defendant and its wholly owned subsidiary,
Half.com, operated websites that allow private sellers to list
goods they wish to sell, either through an auction or at a
fixed price. Plaintiff MercExchange L.L.C. held a number of
patents, including U.S. Patent No. 5,845,265, a business
method patent for an electronic market designed to facilitate
the sale of goods between private individuals by establishing
a central authority to promote trust among participants.
MercExchange filed a patent infringement action against
eBay and Half.com. A jury found that the MercExchange
patent was valid and infringed, and awarded damages.
After the jury verdict, the district court denied
MercExchange’s motion for permanent injunctive relief.
Although the district court cited to the general rule favoring
permanent injunctions in patent cases, the court denied the
injunction by analyzing the traditional four factor test used in
other types of cases.9 The Federal Circuit reversed, applying
its general rule that courts will issue permanent injunctions
against patent infringement absent exceptional circumstances.10 That rule was based on the Patent Act which
states that “patents shall have the attributes of personal
property”11 and grants “the right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention.” 12
The Federal Circuit explained that because the right to
exclude is “the essence of the concept of property,” the
general rule is that a permanent injunction will issue to a
prevailing plaintiff.13
In a short opinion authored by Justice Thomas, the
Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit and its long
standing precedent. The opinion began by outlining the
traditional factors used to determine whether to issue a
9

. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (eBay I), 275 F. Supp. 2d 695,
711 (E.D. Va. 2003).
10
. eBay II, 401 F.3d at 1339.
11
. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2000).
12
. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2000).
13
. eBay II, 401 F.3d at 1338 (citing Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
868 F.2d 1226, 1246–47 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).

BERNARD H. CHAO, "AFTER EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543-572 (2008).

2008]

CHANGING PATENT REMEDIES
permanent injunction:

FOR

PATENT REMEDIES" 9(2)

547

According to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff
seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a four-factor test
before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must demonstrate:
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies
available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to
compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of
hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity
is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.14

The opinion stated that “these principles apply with
equal force” in patent cases and that nothing in the Patent
Act indicates that Congress intended a departure from
them.15 Thus, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the
Patent Act was very different than the Federal Circuit’s. The
Court noted that “creation of a right [under §§ 154, 261] is
distinct from the provision of remedies for violations of that
right.”16 Since § 261 states that it is “[s]ubject to the
provisions of this title” including, presumably, § 283 which
states injunctive relief may only issue “in accordance with
the principles of equity,” the decision did not find a general
rule favoring permanent injunctions.17 As a result, the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Circuit erred by
incorrectly applying a different set of standards for
injunctions in patents cases than for other cases.
Specifically, the Court stated:
We hold only that the decision whether to grant or deny injunctive
relief rests within the equitable discretion of the district courts, and
that such discretion must be exercised consistent with traditional
principles of equity, in patent disputes no less than in other cases
governed by such standards.18

The Supreme Court also criticized the district court’s
analysis: “[a]lthough the District Court recited the traditional
four-factor test, it appeared to adopt certain expansive
principles suggesting that injunctive relief could not issue in
a broad swath of cases.”19 The Supreme Court rejected such
a categorical rule because it was not consistent with the
14

. eBay III, 547 U.S. at 391 (citing Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456
U.S. 305, 311–13 (1982)); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542
(1987)).
15
. eBay III, 547 U.S. at 391.
16
. Id. at. 392.
17
. Id.
18
. Id. at 395.
19
. Id. (citations omitted).

BERNARD H. CHAO, "AFTER EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543-572 (2008).

FOR

PATENT REMEDIES" 9(2)

548

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
[Vol. 9:2
principles of equity and Supreme Court precedent.20
On remand, the district court conducted an extensive
analysis of the four factor test before denying
MercExchange’s request for a permanent injunction.21 With
respect to the first factor, the district court found that
MercExchange had failed to show that it would suffer
irreparable harm absent an injunction chiefly because of
MercExchange’s lack of commercial activity and willingness
to license its patents.22 Noting that the analysis for the
“second factor of the four-factor test inevitably overlaps with
that of the first,” the district court found that MercExchange
had also failed to show that there was no adequate remedy
at law.23 With respect to the third factor, the district court
stated
that
there
was
uncertainty
around
(1)
MercExchange’s ability to compete in the relevant market,
(2) whether eBay had designed around the patent, and (3)
whether the patent would survive reexamination.24 “With the
future so speculative,” the district court found that the
balance of the hardships did not favor either party. 25 Finally,
focusing on MercExchange’s willingness to receive monetary
compensation for its patent, the district court stated that
public interest weighed slightly against entry of a permanent
injunction in this situation.26
The impact of Supreme Court’s eBay decision is that
courts must now determine whether to grant permanent
injunctions in patent cases by using the four factor test used
in other types of cases. Moreover, the courts must avoid
categorical rules and analyze each case individually.
Justice Thomas’ majority opinion did not provide any
guidance on how those factors should be applied. In fact,
the opinion stated that “we take no position on whether
permanent injunctive relief should or should not issue in this
particular case, or indeed in any number of other disputes
20

. Id. at 392 (citing Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag
Co., 210 U.S. 405, 422–30 (1908)).
21
. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc. (eBay IV), 500 F. Supp. 2d 556
(E.D. Va. 2007).
22
. Id. at 571–82, 590.
In a lengthy decision, the district court
explained how numerous different facts impacted its analysis. Only the
most important ones that appeared to be dispositive are summarized here.
23
. Id. at 582–83.
24
. Id. at 583.
25
. Id. at 586–87.
26
. Id. at 587–88.
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arising under the Patent Act.”27 The only guidance provided
in eBay was in Justice Kennedy’s concurrence joined by
Justices Stevens, Souter and Breyer.
This concurrence
suggested that courts consider “the nature of the patent
being enforced and the economic function of the patent
holder.”28 This suggestion provides a basis for looking at
eBay’s four factor test with an economic perspective.

II

APPLICATIONS OF THE FOUR FACTOR TEST

A review of the decisions applying the four eBay factors
reveals a variety of trends, difficult fact patterns, and
arguably flawed applications of the eBay test. This Article
selects three categories of fact patterns that have figured
prominently in decisions to grant or deny a request a
permanent injunction.
These categories are: (1) the
existence of direct competition, (2) the institutional status of
the patent holder, and (3) the value that the patented
technology contributes to the infringing product. The first
and third categories have figured promi-nently in several
decisions. The second category has appeared in a single
case involving an important standard used by wireless local
area networks.
All three categories can be better
understood by analyzing how the four factor test applies,
and assessing whether relying on these fact patterns
forwards the goals of the patent system.
A. DIRECT COMPETITION
One category of fact patterns that has figured
prominently in cases applying the eBay factors—the
existence, or lack of direct competition. In many cases, this
feature appears to be the primary focus of the court’s
inquiry. This Article discusses how courts apply the four
factor test to the existence of direct competition, lack of
direct competition and other variations. It also explains why
focusing on the existence of competition correctly applies
the four factor test and forwards the goals of the patent
system.
The district courts repeatedly focused on the existence
of direct competition between the two parties in determining
whether to grant a permanent injunction. If the plaintiff
27
28

. eBay III, 547 U.S. at 395.
. Id. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

BERNARD H. CHAO, "AFTER EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543-572 (2008).

FOR

PATENT REMEDIES" 9(2)

550

MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH.
[Vol. 9:2
competes directly with the defendant in the market for a
patented invention, that fact weighs in favor of granting a
permanent injunction. Starting with TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar
Communications Corp.,29 several decisions rely heavily on
the presence of direct competition.
In TiVo, the jury found that TiVo’s digital video recorder
(DVR) patent claims were valid and that the defendant
infringed a number of claims.30 TiVo filed motions for Entry of
Judgment and Permanent Injunction.
The district court
focused on the first two eBay factors. Relying on the fact
that the parties were direct competitors, the district court
found that TiVo had demonstrated that the absence of an
injunction would cause it irreparable harm and that there
was no adequate remedy at law.31 Two findings magnified
the importance of direct competition in TiVo and made the
case an even stronger candidate for an injunction. First, the
parties were competing in the nascent DVR market. Thus, as
part of its irreparable harm analysis, the court found that the
plaintiff was losing market share at a critical time in the
market’s development.32 Second, the parties agreed that
DVR customers are “sticky customers,” that is, they tend to
remain customers of the company from which they obtained
their first DVR.33 As a result, the court concluded that “the
full impact of Defendants’ infringement cannot be remedied
by monetary damages.”34
The TiVo court also addressed the last two eBay factors.
It found that because the infringing products did not form
the core of defendants’ business (satellite transmission), but
did directly compete with the plaintiff’s primary product, the
balance of hardships also weighed in favor of granting a
permanent injunction.35 Finally, the court stated the public
interest would not be disservice by a permanent injunction
because the products were not related to public health or
any other key interest.36
29

. TiVo Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 446 F. Supp. 2d 664 (E.D.
Tex. 2006).
30
. Id. at 665.
31
. Id. at 669.
32
. Id. at 669–70.
33
. Id. at 670.
34
. Id.
35
. Id.
36
. Id.
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Subsequent Eastern District of Texas37 decisions have
cited to Tivo for recognizing the “high value of intellectual
property when it is asserted against a direct competitor in
the plaintiff’s market.”38 These cases have not required any
showing that the competitive problem was magnified (i.e.
nascent market or sticky customers) to justify granting a
permanent injunction. Instead, they demonstrate that the
Eastern District of Texas granted permanent injunctions
several times in the presence of direct competition between
the parties.39
Moreover, district courts from other
jurisdictions have also relied on the existence of direct
competition in support of issuing permanent injunctions.40
However, in Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., the District of
Delaware denied a permanent injunction to a plaintiff in the
presence of direct competition, because the plaintiff did not
provide any details on either irreparable harm or the failure
of monetary damages to adequately compensate it.41 Thus,
the court found that the plaintiff had not demonstrated that
it was entitled to an injunction.42 Praxair stands as a warning
to plaintiffs that they may not be able to simply show direct
competition and expect that an injunction will follow.
Furthermore, one district court denied an injunction despite
the plaintiff’s claim that it desired to compete with the
defendant. Interestingly, that was MercExchange, L.L.C. v.
eBay, Inc.,43 the case that that led to the eBay decision. On
remand, the district court denied the request for a
37

. For a variety of reasons, the Eastern District of Texas has become
one of the most popular forums for patent plaintiffs to file suit. As a result,
there are a disproportionate number of decisions regarding patent law from
this district. William C. Rooklidge & Renée L. Stasio, Venue in Patent
Litigation: The Unintended Consequences of Reform, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J.,
Mar. 2008, at 2.
38
. O2 Micro Int’l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., No. 2-04-CV-32
(TJW), 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25948, at *9 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 21, 2007); see
also Visto Corp. v. Seven Network, Inc., No. 2:03-CV-333-TJW, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 91453, at *14 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 19, 2006).
39
. O2 Micro, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *9; MGM Well Servs. v. Mega Lift
Sys., 505 F. Supp. 2d 359, 379 (E.D. Tex 2007); Brooktrout, Inc. v. Eicon
Networks Corp., No. 2:03-CV-59, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43107, at *5 (E.D.
Tex. June 14, 2007); Visto, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *14.
40
. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 502 F. Supp. 2d 477, 482 (W.D.
Pa. 2007); Sanofi-Synthelabo v. Apotex, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 2d 353 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
41
. Praxair, Inc. v. ATMI, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 2d 440, 444 (D. Del. 2007).
42
. Id.
43
. eBay I, 275 F. Supp. 2d 695, 722 (E.D. Va. 2003).
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permanent injunction.44
Several variations on direct competition should also
weigh in favor of a permanent injunction.
For example,
having a licensed subsidiary that competes with the
defendant would seem to provide the same justification for a
permanent injunction as direct competition itself.45 At least
one district court decision has relied on the existence of a
licensee to a subsidiary, in granting a permanent injunction.
In Novozymes A/S v. Genencor International, Inc.,46 the direct
competition between the plaintiff’s subsidiary—and licensee
—and the defendant was the chief consideration cited in
support of a permanent injunction. The court also found the
balance of hardships favored a permanent injunction
because the defendants had apparently pulled the infringing
product from the market.47 Finally, the court noted that
there was no evidence that an injunction would harm the
public.48
Having an exclusive licensee should also weigh in favor
of a permanent injunction. However, in Voda v. Cordis Corp.,
the fact that plaintiff had granted an exclusive license was
considered “irrelevant” because the licensee had not joined
the action and was thus not a party to the lawsuit. 49 This
analysis ignores the problem the plaintiff/licensor faces. If
the plaintiff receives money damages instead of an
injunction, there will effectively be two parties using the
patented technology, the exclusive licensee and the
defendant. Thus, the exclusive licensee will no longer be
“exclusive” and the licensee can justifiably expect some sort
of compensation from the patent holder for the diminished
value of the now non-exclusive license. That request may be
an action against the plaintiff for breach of contract,
44

. eBay IV, 500 F. Supp. 2d 556, 591–92 (E.D. Va. 2007).
. In Paice II, the plaintiff argued that the denial of an injunction and
the grant of an ongoing royalty inhibited the plaintiff’s ability to grant an
exclusive license. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. (Paice II), 504 F.3d 1293,
1314 n.14 (Fed. Cir. 2007). The Federal Circuit found that there was
substantial evidence to support the district court’s finding that the form of
relief would not discourage other potential licensees. Id.
46
. Novozymes A/S v. Genencor Int’l, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 592, 613 (D.
Del. 2007).
47
. Id.
48
. Id.
49
. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63623, at *19 (W.D. Ok. Sept. 5, 2006).
45
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rescission, reformation or even unjust enrichment. These
potential problems should be considered as important
consideration in the irreparable harm/no adequate remedy
prongs of the eBay test. The Voda court should have
considered these problems and the existence of an exclusive
licensee should weigh in favor of granting a permanent
injunction regardless of whether the licensee joins in the
action.
While the cases discussed above demonstrate that the
existence of direct competition generally results in a
permanent injunction. The converse is also true. Lack of
direct competition generally results in the denial of a
permanent injunction.50 There is one notable exception. In
Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation
v. Buffalo Technology Inc., the court granted a permanent
injunction even though the plaintiff, Commonwealth
Scientific & Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO) did not
compete with the defendant.51
The court issued a
permanent injunction relying chiefly on the fact that CSIRO is
a research institution.52
Thus, the existence of direct competition appears to be a
good predictor of whether a permanent injunction will issue.
This is a sensible consideration for a number of reasons.
First, the analysis is consistent with the basic goal of the
patent system to maximize the public good by promoting
innovation without unduly stifling competition.53 When a
defendant does not compete with a plaintiff, an injunction
serves to deny the public access to a product that uses the
patented technology. By contrast, when competition exists,
the public still has access to the products being enjoined. 54
The injunction merely serves to shift market share and the
corresponding monetary rewards of the patented technology
to the plaintiff.
Consideration of the existence or absence of direct
competition appears to be a proper application of eBay’s
50

. See Paice II, 504 F.3d at 1314 n.14; z4 Techs., Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
51
. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc.,
492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 603 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
52
. See infra text accompanying notes 60–71.
53
. See INNOVATION, supra note 8, at 8.
54
. Not all patented inventions provide a substantial benefit to the
public. Courts can examine what interest the public has in the particular
patented invention under the fourth eBay factor.
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four factors.
When competition is present, monetary
damages generally do not compensate a plaintiff for the
value of future business goodwill (i.e. what is the value for
being known as the next Apple Computer) that it receives
from increasing market share. In contrast, when there is no
competition, the plaintiff does not suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of an injunction because it is not losing any
market share. Moreover, monetary damages are adequate
because those are the only compensation that such a
plaintiff can obtain; an injunction merely serves to increase
the settlement value of a monetary damages amount. The
balance of hardships also weighs in favor of denying
injunctive relief in the absence of direct competition. The
defendant will clearly be harmed by the inability to offer its
product or services, but there is no corresponding hardship
suffered by the patent holder. Finally, the public has at least
some interest in having the patented technology available.
Third, the test is relatively straightforward and not easily
subject to manipulation. The existence of competition in the
market is readily discernable. Either the parties are selling
products that compete or they are not. Of course there will
be a few cases that are at the margin. For example, in
Verizon Services, the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiff’s
evidence of lost sales, price erosion and lost opportunities to
sell other services was sufficient to show irreparable harm,
and the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to grant a
permanent injunction.55 However, neither the district court
nor the Federal Circuit examined whether the competition
existed in services that used the patented technology.
In Verizon, Verizon asserted patents that claimed
technology useful for internet telephony.56
Defendant
Vonage provides telephone services using Voice over IP
(VoIP), a technology that uses the internet to carry voice
signals, while Verizon is primarily known for traditional
landline and wireless telephones.57 When the Federal Circuit
cited to lost sales and price erosion, it was unclear whether
55

. Verizon Servs. Corp v. Vonage Holding Corp., 503 F.3d 1295, 1311
(Fed. Cir. 2007).
56
. Id. at 1298.
57
. A search of the Verizon website, http://www22.verizon.com, reveals
that Verizon does have a VoIP service that it calls VoiceWing broadband
phone service. However, the information about VoiceWing is not displayed
nearly as prominently as its other phone services. See Verizon,
http://www22. verizon.com (last visited Apr. 18, 2008).
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the Federal Circuit was pointing to Vonage products that use
its patented technology or not.
Presumably, the lost
opportunities to sell other services did not use the patented
technology. It is at least possible that Verizon was using its
patents to safeguard its traditional telephone service against
the development of internet telephony. If internet telephony
is actually superior to traditional landline technology, the
public may have been disserved by an injunction even in the
presence of direct competition. This issue does not appear
to have been reviewed by the courts in the Verizon
decisions.
In the future, courts may wish to examine what kind of
competition the plaintiff identifies in support of its request
for an injunction.
The public has an interest in having
access to new patented technology If the patent holder is
not offering products using its own patents, there may be
less reason for the court to grant the injunction. To be sure,
any kind of competition may tend to show irreparable harm,
but in some cases the public interest in access to the most
recent technology, and presumably the best technology,
may be equally important.
Thus, direct competition should be an important, but not
dispositive consideration. The alternative would violate the
Supreme Court’s prohibition in eBay on broad categorical
rules.
There are still other circumstances where no
injunction should issue even when the plaintiff and
defendant are direct competitors—for example, when the
patent covers a relatively unimportant feature of a product,
but the costs of a design-around are high.58

58

. See discussion infra Part III.B.
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A second category of fact patterns is the institutional
status of the plaintiff (e.g. research institution or troll). One
recent district court case granted an injunction based
primarily on the plaintiff’s status as a research institution.
This case has been watched carefully because of the
powerful precedent it may set and because the plaintiff has
argued that its patent covers all products that practice the
IEEE 802.11a and g standards.59 This section criticizes the
decision as an incorrect application of the four factor test
and argues that focusing on the institutional status of the
plaintiff does not forward the goals of the patent system.
In Commonwealth Scientific & Industrial Research
Organisation (CSIRO) v. Buffalo,60 the plaintiff was the
principal scientific research organization of the Australian
Federal Government.61 It had developed and patented a
wireless local area network (WLAN) technology. CSIRO sued
the Buffalo defendants claiming that the defendants’ WLAN
products infringed CSIRO’s WLAN patent. The district court
granted CSIRO’s summary judgment on both infringement
and validity and infringement.
Before damages were determined, the district court
granted CSIRO’s motion for permanent injunction using the
four factor test required by eBay. In analyzing these factors,
the court heavily relied on the plaintiff’s status as a research
organization. The court determined that CSIRO would be
irreparably harmed in two ways if an injunction did not issue.
First, having its patent challenged “impugns CSIRO’s
reputation as a leading scientific research entity.” 62 Second,
patent challenges divert money from research and delays in
research are likely to result in “CSIRO being pushed out of
valuable fields as other research groups achieve critical
intellectual property positions.”63 This analysis is suspect
because the two cited harms are related to the cost of
litigation, and not to the failure to issue an injunction.64
59

. Practically all wireless local area networks currently use this
standard.
60
. 492 F. Supp. 2d 600 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
61
. Id. at 601.
62
. Id. at 604.
63
. Id.
64
. Id. The court also analyzed the adequacy of damages, but this
analysis was not based on the fact that CSIRO was a research institution.
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Moreover, the Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have
previously discussed the public’s strong public interest in
“resolving questions of patent invalidity”65 and the Federal
Circuit held that lost research opportunities do not constitute
irreparable harm.66 Nonetheless, this discussion shows that
CSIRO’s status as a research institution was considered
throughout the district court’s analysis.
The district court also relied on CSIRO’s status as a
research institution to find that the balance of hardships
favored granting an injunction.67 The court stated that the
Buffalo defendants’ hardship was “purely monetary.”68 In
contrast, the court found that the failure to issue an
injunction would injure CSIRO and “negatively impact
CSIRO's research and development efforts and its ability to
bring new technologies into fruition.”69 As a result, the court
found that the balance of hardships favored issuing an
injunction.
Finally, the court found that the public had an interest in
issuing an injunction. The court started with the premise that
the public has an interest in a strong patent system. 70 The
court then discussed at some length the “enormous
benefits” that research institutions have produced.71 More
specifically, the court stated that the public interest is
“advanced by encouraging investment by research
organizations into future technologies and serves to promote
the progress of science and the useful arts.”72 As a result,
Commonwealth Scientific appears to stand for the
proposition that the public has a greater interest in
protecting the patent rights of research institutions than
other entities, and that permanent injunctions should be
awarded to these types of entities.
Id. at 606.
65
. Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, 508 U.S. 83, 100 (1993);
Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 344–46
(1971); see also Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex. Corp., 403 F.3d
1331, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
66
. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Am. Cynamid Co., 82 F.3d 1568, 1578 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
67
. Commonwealth, 492 F. Supp. 2d at 606–07.
68
. Id. at 606.
69
. Id.
70
. Id. at 607.
71
. Id.
72
. Id.
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The Commonwealth Scientific analysis is both a
questionable application of the eBay factors and bad policy.
First, the irreparable harm/inadequate remedy factors do not
favor non-practicing research institutions. An injunction only
helps a non-practicing entity by increasing the settlement
value of its patent.
By definition, this harm can be
adequately addressed through monetary damages.
Moreover, there is no reason to distinguish a research
institution from other non-practicing entities.
The only
rationale found in Commonwealth Scientific is that public
interest favors research institutions because of the benefit
they provide society—future research. However, it is unclear
whether public research institutions actually are more
efficient at promoting technology.73 There is at least a
reasonable argument that encouraging entrepreneurial
environments like that found in Silicon Valley is the best way
to encourage rapid technological development.
Finally, if being a public research institution were to be
widely accepted as an appropriate consideration under eBay,
patent holders could game the system by becoming or
sponsoring research institutions. Indeed, many established
patent holders have established research foundations (e.g.,
the Lemelson Foundation).74 Taken to the extreme, patent
holders could commit a particular portion of any recovery to
charitable institutions, thereby increasing the likelihood of an
injunction and the value of their patents. Still further, the
money due to the charitable institution may only be due
upon the issuance of an injunction.75 Surely it would be
73

. Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, (Stanford Pub. L.
Working
Paper
No.
980776)
8–13
(2006),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/ sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=980776.
74
. Jerome Lemelson had frequently litigated his patents and had been
accused of being a “patent troll.” He also established the Lemelson
Foundation to support inventors and entrepreneurs. Who We Are: The
Lemelson Foundation, http://web.mit.edu/invent/w-foundation.html (last
visited Mar. 23, 2008). Some might suggest that the foundation was
established to give him credibility as Lemeslon’s patents were litigated.
This article takes no position on why the Lemelson Foundation was
established. It merely points to the possibility that such tactics are used.
75
. The press release for the settlement of Verizon Services Corp. v.
Vonage Holding Corp., 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2007) indicates that
Vonage will have to pay $2.5 million to charity if its appeal fails or if a stay
of Verizon’s injunction is lifted. Press Release, Vonage, Vonage and
Verizon Settle Patent Dispute (Oct. 25, 2007), available at
http://pr.vonage.com/ releasedetail.cfm?ReleaseID=271491. Is this an
example of corporate gener-osity or of a plaintiff trying to manufacture
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unfair to the defendants and unwise for courts to allow
patent holders to manufacture a situation that results in a
permanent injunction.

C. THE PATENTED INVENTION’S RELATION

TO THE INFRINGING

DEVICE

A third category of fact patterns that has figured in some
decisions applying the four factor test is the relative
contribution the patented invention has to the infringing
device. This section describes how courts have analyzed the
relative contribution a patented invention makes to the
infringing device when applying the four factor test. This
Article suggests that this should be an important
consideration especially when viewed from an economic
perspective. Courts should be wary of granting a permanent
injunction for a patent that contributes little to the infringing
device because that can result in over compensation.
However, the converse is not true. Courts should be not be
concerned that denying a permanent injunction for a
patented invention that contributes substantially to the
infringing device will result in under compensation. Finally,
this Article explains how the courts can fine tune injunctions
to avoid both over and under compensation.
A permanent injunction is a powerful remedy that
rewards patent holders. However, when issued without
examining the particular facts of the case, an injunction can
overcompensate a patent holder for its relative contribution.
Justice Kennedy recognized this problem when he warned
that an injunction “can be employed as a bargaining tool to
charge exorbitant fees to companies that seek to buy
licenses to practice the patent.”76
Courts must examine the relationship of the patented
invention to the infringing product and determine whether
an injunction is appropriate. This is precisely the kind of
analysis Justice Kennedy suggested in his concurrence when
he stated:
When the patented invention is but a small component of the
product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an
injunction is employed simply for undue leverage in negotiations,
legal damages may well be sufficient to compensate for the
infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.77
“public interest” in support of an injunction?
76
. eBay III, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
77
. Id. at 396–97.
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Recast in economic terms, one important consideration
is whether the injunction would properly reward the patent
holder for the patent’s technical contribution without
overcompensating the patent holder.

1. Guarding Against Overcompensation
An example of the overcompensation issue occurred in
z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp.78 In z4, the jury
found that Microsoft’s Office and Windows products infringed
two patents.79 The patents disclose methods of limiting the
unauthorized use of computer software, referred to as
product activation.80 This feature was only a small part of
the infringing products.81
The plaintiff asked the court to enjoin current Windows
XP and Office products and to deactivate servers that control
product activation for the infringing products.82 The district
court refused to issue a permanent injunction.83 The district
court first noted that Microsoft’s products do not compete
with z4’s.84
However, relying on Justice Kennedy’s
concurrence, the court also discussed why money damages
were adequate in view of the relationship between the
patented invention and the infringing product. Specifically,
the court stated:
Here, product activation is a very small component of the Microsoft
Windows and Office software products that the jury found to
infringe z4's patents. The infringing product activation component
of the software is in no way related to the core functionality for
which the software is purchased by consumers.85

The facts show that the value of the patented invention
to the accused Microsoft product was relatively small.86 The
78

. 434 F. Supp. 2d 437 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
. Id. at 438.
80
. Id.
81
. Id. at 440.
82
. Id. at 439.
83
. Id. at 444.
84
. Id. at 440 (“There is no logical reason that a potential consumer or
licensee of z4’s technology would have dissuaded from purchasing or
licensing z4’s product activation technology for use in its own software
due to Microsoft’s infringement.”).
85
. Id. at 441.
86
. The concept of “relatively small” should be distinguished from no
value. The jury did award the plaintiff $115 million for past infringement.
Presumably, this is a small portion of Microsoft’s sales of these two
incredibly successful software products. Id. at 438.
79

BERNARD H. CHAO, "AFTER EBAY, INC. V. MERCEXCHANGE: THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 543-572 (2008).

2008]

FOR

PATENT REMEDIES" 9(2)

CHANGING PATENT REMEDIES
561
invention was clearly not vital to the products’ core function
because Microsoft was already eliminating the patented
invention from future versions of Windows and Office in
2007.
However, the cost of eliminating the patented
technology from existing products was extremely high. If
Microsoft were forced to redesign current versions, it would
have had to re-release 450 separate variations of Office in
37 different languages and 600 different variations in 40
languages.87 If its product activation servers were turned off,
Microsoft argued that the market would be flooded with
pirated software.88 Based on these findings, the district
court denied the injunction.
This result was consistent with the goals underlying the
patent system because it based the plaintiff’s reward on the
relative contribution of the patented invention to the
infringing product. Without an injunction, z4 had only one
significant bargaining chip to offer Microsoft in settlement
negotiations—the value of its patented product activation
feature in both current and future generations of Windows
and Office. To keep the patented technology in the current
product, Microsoft had to continue to pay a reasonable
royalty based on the jury’s damage reward.89 For future
products, the parties could negotiate a rate based on the
value that the patented invention actually contributes to the
products, or Microsoft could simply eliminate the feature.
If an injunction had issued, however, z4 would have an
additional lever. It could force Microsoft to incur expenses
associated with eliminating the patented technology from its
current products. The former consideration seems to be
precisely the type of compensation that the patent system
should provide z4—allowing parties to negotiate the value of
particular technology. However, the cost savings associated
with a design around has no relationship to the value that
the patented invention contributes to a product. It is simply
the unfortunate side effect of resolving patent disputes after
products are designed and sold. By denying z4’s request for
an injunction, the court applied the eBay factors in a manner
that eliminated the cost of a design around as a lever in
settlement negotiations.
The z4 case did not present the most challenging set of
87
88
89

. Id. at 442.
. Id. at 443.
. Id.
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facts because the plaintiff, z4, did not compete with
Microsoft. As a result, that consideration also weighed
heavily in denying the request for a permanent injunction.
The more interesting case will be one in which the parties
are: (1) direct competitors, (2) the patented technology is an
insignificant part of the infringing device, and (3) the cost of
designing around or eliminating the patented technology is
extremely high. This scenario could easily occur in the
semiconductor industry where the cost of making an
insignificant change to the design of a semiconductor chip
can be extremely high. When the patented technology is
sufficiently insignificant and the redesign cost is sufficiently
high, an injunction should be denied even in the presence of
direct competition. From a patent policy perspective this
makes sense because the public does not have an interest in
incentivizing competitors to play “gotcha” by expending
resources to enforce patents with minimal value.

2. Guarding Against Under Compensation?
Both Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in eBay and the z4
case relate to the problem of overcompensating a patent
holder for the contribution the patented technology makes to
an infringing device by granting a permanent injunction.
However, if an economic-based approach is correct, then the
opposite problem is at least theoretically possible. The court
in Commonwealth Scientific tried to extend the law in this
direction by suggesting that the denial of an injunction would
fail to fully compensate the patent holder. In analyzing the
adequacy of damages, the district court stated that:
Since [defendant’s] infringement relates to the essence of the
technology and is not a “small component” of [defendant’s]
infringing products, monetary damages are less adequate in
compensating [plaintiff] for [defendant’s] future infringement.90

Similarly, the District of Delaware in IMX Inc. v.
LendingTree LLC also indicated that when infringement is
not limited to a minor component, irreparable harm is more
likely to be found.91 These cases reflect a misunderstanding
of the overcompensation problem. Injunctions result in
overcompen-sation when the costs of designing around the
90

. Commonwealth Sci. & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech. Inc.,
492 F. Supp. 2d 600, 606 (E.D. Tex. 2007).
91
. IMX Inc. v. LendingTree L.L.C., 469 F. Supp. 2d. 203, 225 (D. Del.
2007).
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patented invention are significant compared to the value of
the patented invention itself.92 In those cases, granting a
permanent injunction provides the patent holder with a
windfall that is unrelated to the value of the patented
invention. That windfall is the ability of the patent holder to
force the infringer to redesign its products. The injunction
allows the patent holder to recover a substantial portion of
the costs associated with the redesign in any settlement.
The denial of a permanent injunction, however, does not
suffer from a similar gap between what the compensation a
patent holder should and does receive. In other words, the
infringer has no lever that allows it to pay less than the value
the patented invention contributes to the infringing product.
Even when an injunction is denied, courts can continue to
award an ongoing royalty, a compulsory license only
available to the losing party,93 or the patent holder can bring
a later suit for that infringement. One way or another, these
remedies should compensate the patent holder for the value
that the patented invention contributes to the infringing
product. The parameters of an ongoing royalty have not yet
been determined. To date some courts have based the rate
on the jury’s award of past damages.94 Therefore, the fact
that the patented invention is a large or important
component of the infringing product should not be given
substantial weight when determining whether to grant a
permanent injunction.

3. Tailoring the Injunction
The z4 and Commonwealth Scientific decisions show how
courts are considering the relationship between the patented
invention and the infringing product in determining whether
to issue a permanent injunction. However, the granting or
92

. The value of the patented invention can be thought of as the value
the patented invention adds to the product if it were designed from
scratch.
93
. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1315 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
94
. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63623, at *18 (W.D. Ok. Sept. 5, 2006); Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV Group,
Inc., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76380, at *2 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006); but see
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., SACV 05-467-JVS(RNBx), 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 86627 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007) (for infringement that would take
place during a sunset period—that is until a permanent injunction went into
effect—the court trebled the jury determined royalty rate for past
infringement).
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denying of a permanent injunction can be a rather blunt
instrument. The Federal Circuit has recently suggested that
when considering the eBay factors, courts can craft the
injunction to reflect the individual circumstances of the case.
In Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holding Corp., the
defendant was found to have infringed valid patents and the
district court granted an injunction.95 The Federal Circuit
affirmed the injunction, but in a footnote, the court
suggested that as part of the balance of hardships analysis,
the district court should have considered allowing time for
Vonage to implement a workaround to avoid infringement:
One factor that is relevant to the balance of the hardships required
by the Supreme Court’s decision in eBay was not considered by the
district court, namely whether the district court should have
allowed time for [defendant] to implement a workaround that
would avoid continued infringement of the ’574 and ’711 patents
before issuing its injunction. [Plaintiff] had a cognizable interest in
obtaining an injunction to put an end to infringement of its patents;
it did not have a cognizable interest in putting Vonage out of
business.96

The Federal Circuit made its suggestion in the context of
analyzing the balance of hardships, but it did not cite to
Justice Kennedy’s eBay concurrence. However, the proposed
remedy fits extremely well within the framework he
suggested. For example, the design around cost may be
extremely high if the injunction requires immediate
implementation. However, it may be quite reasonable given
a longer time frame. As a result, as the design around costs
decrease, any overcompensation that a patent holder
receives for its contribution to the infringing products grows
correspondingly smaller.
This type of remedy mirrors the outcome of the z4 case.
Although no injunction was issued, Microsoft was not going
to include the patented invention in its next generation
products. Thus, the parties’ bargaining position probably
would have not changed substantially if the district court had
granted an injunction that permitted Microsoft sufficient time
to redesign it products.97
95

. Verizon Servs. Corp v. Vonage Holding Corp., 503 F.3d 1295 (Fed.
Cir. 2007)
96
. Id. at 1311 n.12.
97
. This may be an oversimplification because Microsoft may have
difficulty both complying with an injunction and supporting earlier
infringing products.
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Although Verizon suggests that the delayed injunction is
an appropriate way to account for the balance of hardships,
it also serves to mitigate problems associated with
overcompensating a patent holder for many of the same
reasons related to the balance of hardship analysis. Thus,
courts can be expected to delay injunctions when to do so
would further satisfy the eBay factors. Recently, the court in
Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm,98 took this approach by
granting the defendant a 20 month sunset provision in which
it was allowed to continue to sell some specific infringing
devices.99
Delaying injunctions may be just one way to tailor an
injunction. In some cases, the design around costs for some
products may be higher than others. For example, in the z4
case, the cost associated with eliminating the patented
invention from Windows may be quite different from
redesigning Office. This suggests that courts should at least
consider granting an injunction against some—but not
necessarily all—infringing products in the same case.
Indeed, the Broadcom case involved several different
patents and the court’s decision applied the eBay factors
separately for different patents.100

III AFTER AN INJUNCTION IS DENIED, ARE
PLAINTIFFS LEFT WITH AN ONGOING ROYALTY?
Since permanent injunctions were almost always granted
to prevailing patents plaintiffs before eBay, courts are now
confronted with a new set of issues—what to do with
infringing defendants in the absence of a permanent
injunction? There appears to be two primary options. The
courts could impose a compulsory license or “ongoing
royalty”101 on the defendant and force it to pay the patent
98

. Broadcom, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86627.
. The scope of permitted sales was defined by infringing products
which were in fact sold on or before May 29, 2007 (the date of the jury
verdict) to the prior or existing customers for those products on that date.
Id. at *13, *18.
100
. Id.
101
. In Paice II the Federal Circuit distinguished the term “ongoing
royalty” from “compulsory license.” Paice II, 504 F.3d 1293, 1313 n.13
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (emphasis in original). The decision states that a
compulsory license “implies that anyone who meets certain criteria has
congressional authority to use that which is licensed.” Id. In contrast, an
ongoing royalty “is limited to one particular set of defendants.” Id..
99
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holder for continued infringement. Alternatively, a court
could “do nothing,” thereby forcing the defendant to choose
between stopping infringement, obtaining a license or risk a
future verdict of willful infringement.
Section III explores the infringement remedies that
courts should, and are granting for future infringements now
that permanent injunctions are not always available. In
particular, Section III A describes the ongoing royalty. This
Article argues that this remedy has no basis in case or
statutory law. Section III B explains that the courts do not
need to replace the permanent injunction. They can “do
nothing” because the existing doctrine of willful infringement
already adequately safeguards the patent holder against
future infringement by the losing defendant.

A. AN ONGOING ROYALTY,

THE

ALTERNATIVE

TO A

PERMANENT INJUNCTION.

To date, several courts have imposed what the Federal
Circuit in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. calls an “ongoing
royalty.”102 The Federal Circuit recently addressed the issue
of whether courts have the authority to grant this relief. In
Paice, the plaintiff sued Toyota on three patents related to
drive-trains for hybrid electric vehicles. The jury eventually
returned a verdict of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents on one of the patents, and awarded
$4,269,950.00 to Paice as a reasonable royalty.103 After an
analysis of the four factor test, the district court denied the
plaintiff’s request for a permanent injunction and instead
imposed an ongoing royalty.
Specifically, Toyota was
ordered to pay an “ongoing royalty of $ 25.00 per infringing
[vehicle].”104
Paice appealed the decision arguing, inter alia, that the
district court did not have the statutory authority to issue
this order and that Paice was denied its Seventh Amendment
right to a jury trial to establish the ongoing royalty rate. The
Federal Circuit looked to 35 U.S.C. § 283 which states:
The several courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may
grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of equity to
prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms
102

. Id.
. Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. (Paice I), No. 2:04-CV-211-DF,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61600 (E.D. Tex Aug. 16, 2006), aff’d in part vacated
in part, Paice II, 504 F.3d 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
104
. Paice II, 504 F.3d at 1313–14.
103
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The Federal Circuit framed the issue by stating that it
must determine “whether an order permitting use of a
patented invention in exchange for a royalty is properly
characterized as preventing the violation of the rights
secured by the patent.”106 However, after setting up a
question of statutory construction, the Federal Circuit
sidestepped it by merely citing to a patent case107 and an
antirust case108 that granted ongoing royalties. Neither case
discussed 35 U.S.C. § 283.
In Shatterproof Glass, the
defendant did not object to the principal of an ongoing
royalty; instead the appeal challenged the amount.
Therefore, the opinion never addressed whether courts have
the authority to order an ongoing royalty in a patent case,
nor did it discuss or cite to 35 U.S.C. § 283. U.S. v Glaxo is
even further afield because the case concerned antitrust
remedies. It also never mentioned 35 U.S.C. § 283.
Relying on this rather thin support, Paice found that
courts have the authority to grant on-going royalties in
patent cases. However, the Federal Circuit suggested that
court should not impose “such relief as a matter of course
whenever a permanent injunction is not imposed.”109
Instead, the district court may wish to allow the parties to
negotiate a license. If that attempt fails, “the district court
could step in to assess a reasonable royalty in light of the
ongoing infringement.”110
Even before Paice, several district courts had chosen the
same remedy and granted an ongoing royalty after denying
a request for permanent injunction. For example in Voda,
the district court ordered the defendant to make quarterly
reports on post-verdict infringing sales, presumably to pay
the royalty rate assessed by the jury.111 Similarly, in Finisar
105

. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
. Paice II, 504 F.3d at 1314.
107
. Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co., 758 F.2d 613,
628 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
108
. United States v. Glaxo Group Ltd., 410 U.S. 52, 59 (1973).
109
. Paice II, 504 F.3d 1293, 1314–15 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
110
. Id.
111
. Voda v. Cordis Corp., No. CIV-03-1512-L, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
63623, at *20 (W.D. Ok. Sept. 5, 2006). Although the plaintiff asked the
court to order quarterly reports so that the defendant could pay the royalty
rate assessed by the jury, the decision never specifically discusses the
royalty rate. Based on the court’s statement that post-verdict damages
106
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the court denied the motion for a permanent injunction but
ordered the defendants to pay $1.60 per unit for the life of
the plaintiff’s patent.112 However, these decisions did not
address whether courts have the authority to grant ongoing
royalties.
Although the courts have either ignored or failed to
satisfactorily explain why they have the authority to grant
ongoing royalties, they may believe that they have no
alternative after the eBay decision. After all, eBay envisions
successful patent plaintiffs that are not granted a permanent
injunction. Given that situation, courts may believe that the
only alternative to allowing post verdict infringement is to
force the defendant to pay some form of ongoing royalty.
With that dilemma in mind, the Paice court appears to have
implicitly answered the § 283 issue it presented with a yes:
an order permitting use of a patented invention in exchange
for a royalty is properly characterized as preventing the
violation of the rights secured by the patent.
While this analysis may satisfy the second part of § 283,
it ignores the first phrase. The first phrase limits the
authority the statute grants to injunctions: “The several
courts having jurisdiction of cases under this title may grant
injunctions . . . to prevent the violation of any right secured
by patent . . . .”113 Indeed, the statute is titled “Injunctions”
and the statute does not discuss any other kind of relief.114
The courts could characterize an ongoing royalty as a
conditional injunction that enjoins the defendant from
infringing unless it pays the royalty prescribed by the court.
However, the courts do not need to stretch § 283 in this
manner to prevent post filing infringement.

B. A THIRD WAY: DO NOTHING.
The courts could do nothing. Doing nothing does not
necessarily allow a defendant to continuing infringing a
patent.
Once a permanent injunction is denied, doing
nothing may actually serve as a greater deterrent to future
consisted of “simple mathematical calculations,” it appears that the court
intended to use the royalty rate determined by the jury. Id.
112
. Finisar Corp. v. DirectTV Group, No. 1:05-CV-264, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76380, at *5 (E.D. Tex. July 7, 2006).
113
. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000) (emphasis added).
114
. The statute could have allowed the courts to grant “relief” like 35
U.S.C. § 291, which discusses interfering patents.
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infringement than imposing an ongoing royalty.
If the
defendant continues to infringe after losing a first lawsuit, a
subsequent lawsuit carries the very real risk of a finding of
willful infringement that would result in enhanced damages
and attorneys fees. This may describe the method used in
Saffran v. Boston Scientific Corp.115 After a jury verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, Judge Ward issued an order sua sponte
“severing plaintiff’s continuing causes of action for future
royalties.”116 The order does not specify whether future
royalties will be at the same rate calculated by the jury for
past damages or be enhanced for willful infringement.
Section 284 of the Patent Act states that a court “may
increase the damages up to three times the amount found or
assessed.”117 Although the statute does not provide a
standard for determining when to enhance damages, the
Federal Circuit has long held that enhancing damages
requires a showing of willful infringement.118 To establish
willful infringement “a patentee must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an
objectively high likelihood that his actions constituted
infringement of a valid patent.”119 Once that standard is
satisfied, “the patentee must also demonstrate that this
objectively-defined risk (determined by the record of the
infringement proceedings) was either known or so obvious
that it should have been known to the accused infringer.120
A plaintiff can easily satisfy this standard if the
defendant continues to infringe after losing a first lawsuit.
Having already lost the first lawsuit, there is no doubt that
the infringer was aware of the patent and aware that he
would lose the second lawsuit. Indeed, claim preclusion
should prevent the defendant from re-litigating infringement
and invalidity121 and the case should merely revolve around
115

. Saffran v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2-05-CV-547, 2007 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76135 (E.D. Tex Feb. 14, 2008).
116
. Saffran v. Boston Scientific Corp., No. 2-05-CV-547, at 1 (E.D. Tex.
Feb. 14, 2008) (order severing plaintiff’s causes of action for future
royalties).
117
. 35 U.S.C.A. § 284 (2006).
118
. In re Seagate Technology LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1368 (Fed Cir. 2007)
(en banc) (citing Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithography
Co., 923 F.2d 1576, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
119
. Seagate, 497 F.3d at 1370.
120
. Id.
121
. See Hallco Mfg. Co. v. Foster, 256 F.3d 1290, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
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damages and willfulness. Similarly, there is a real likelihood
that a second case would be considered “exceptional” under
35 U.S.C. § 284.
In that case, the court could award
attorneys fees to the plaintiff as well.
Thus, in the absence of a permanent injunction, doing
nothing may actually provide a greater deterrence than an
ongoing royalty based on the jury award.122 The defendant
would face the choice of: (1) avoiding infringement either by
completely halting the infringing activity or redesigning its
product/service, (2) negotiating a license, or (3) risking a
second lawsuit that will likely result in a finding of willful
infringement and the risk of enhanced damages and
attorneys fees.
Many plaintiffs would prefer this situation to receiving an
ongoing royalty. As a result, plaintiffs that do satisfy eBay
may consider doing nothing as well. These plaintiffs can ask
for past damages and forego seeking a permanent
injunction.
If the defendant continues to infringe after
judgment, the plaintiff could recover treble damages instead
of an ongoing royalty that the plaintiff may view as
insufficient.
The court in Broadcom recently used a similar approach
to calculate the royalty rate for a sunset period—the time
between the jury verdict and the court ordered injunction
taking effect.123 The court reasoned that any infringement
after a jury verdict is by definition willful and thus the court
trebled the jury’s royalty rate.124 The approach taken in
Broadcom provides the same compensation to the plaintiff
as a second lawsuit for willful infringement. Moreover, since
35 U.S.C. § 283 allows courts to issue injunctions “on such
terms as the court deems reasonable”, the approach rests
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §§ 18–19 (1982) (“The general
concept of claim preclusion is that when a final judgment is rendered on
the merits, another action may not be maintained between the parties on
the same ‘claim,’ and defenses that were raised or could have been raised
in that action are extinguished.”).
122
. In a concurring opinion, Judge Rader suggested that an ongoing
royalty rate may be different than one awarded by a jury because of “the
change in the parties’ legal relationship and other factors.” Paice II, 504
F.3d 1293, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Rader, J., concurring).
123
. As discussed earlier, the Broadcom court allowed the defendant a
sunset period before Broadcom was enjoined from infringement. See
supra notes 98–99 and accompanying text.
124
. Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., SACV 05-467-JVS(RNBx), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86627, at *19–*20 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2007).
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on solid legal footing.125 However, as discussed above, 35
U.S.C. § 283 does not apply when an injunction is not issued.
The “do nothing” approach takes into account willful
infringement while reconciling eBay with the two statutes
that would appear to be at odds with ongoing royalties.
Section 154(a)(1) of the Patent Act grants a patentee “the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale,
or selling the invention”126 Indeed, forcing a plaintiff to pay
an ongoing royalty appears to directly violate this statute. In
contrast, doing nothing would allow a patentee to continue
to enforce its right to exclude. After losing a first lawsuit, a
defendant continues to infringe at its own peril. Moreover,
without the “do nothing” approach, eBay appears to force
courts to stretch 35 U.S.C. § 283 to authorize an ongoing
royalty remedy.

IV CONCLUSION
After eBay, permanent injunctions in patent cases will be
granted based on the same four factor test used in other
contexts. The test requires courts to analyze: (1) whether
the plaintiff will suffer irreparable harm without the
injunction; (2) whether there is an adequate remedy at law;
(3) the balance of hardships on the respective parties; and
(4) whether granting an injunction would disservice the
public interest. Applying the four factor test in patent cases
raises two sets of new issues: identifying what facts are
important in determining whether to issue a permanent
injunction and how to handle future infringement after a
permanent injunction is denied.
As a threshold matter, the courts must determine what
fact patterns are important in deciding whether to grant
permanent injunctions. This Article has analyzed three
categories of fact patterns that have figured prominently in
deciding whether to grant a permanent injunction: (1) the
existence, or lack of direct competition, (2) the institutional
status of the plaintiff (e.g. research institution or troll), and
(3) the relative contribution the patented invention has to
the infringing device. This Article argued that both the
existence of competition and the relative contribution the
patented invention makes to the infringing device should
125
126

. 35 U.S.C. § 283 (2000).
. 35 U.S.C.A. § 154(a)(1) (2006).
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play an important role in deciding whether to grant a
permanent injunction. However, the institutional status of
the plaintiff should not.
In arriving at these conclusions, this Article analyzed
these fact patterns by critically examining the decisions
applying eBay’s four factor test to these facts and assessing
whether the focusing on these fact patterns forwarded the
goals of the patent system. Broadly, the patent system is
intended to promote innovation without stifling competition.
Thus, this Article discusses how focusing on particular fact
patterns would: promote the availability of technology, avoid
market players from incurring unnecessary costs, and
correctly compensate patent holders for the contribution
their inventions make to any infringement.
The fact
patterns addressed in this Article are prominent, but not
exhaustive examples of the problems courts are currently
addressing. As courts continue to confront new fact patterns
in patent cases, they should also keep in mind the goals of
the patent system when applying the four factor test.
For the first time, courts are not granting permanent
injunctions to many successful patent plaintiffs. Previously,
permanent injunctions served to prevent losing defendants
from continuing to infringe the plaintiff’s patents. Thus, the
second new major issue that courts must resolve after eBay
is examining what do in the absence of a permanent
injunction.
Some courts have replaced the permanent
injunction with an ongoing royalty, a compulsory license that
is only available to the losing defendant.
This Article
reviewed the purported basis for the ongoing royalty and
argues that the remedy is not grounded in either case law or
statutory authority. However, the lack of an alternative
remedy is not as problematic as it would seem. The courts
do not need to replace permanent injunctions. They can “do
nothing” because the existing doctrine of willful infringement
adequately guards a patent holder against future
infringement by a losing defendant.

